Privacy-the Civil Liberties Issue by Breslin, Dr. John
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 14
Number 3 Dickinson Journal of International Law Article 3
5-1-1996
Privacy-the Civil Liberties Issue
Dr. John Breslin
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the Privacy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Breslin, Dr. John (1996) "Privacy-the Civil Liberties Issue," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 14: No. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol14/iss3/3
Privacy - the Civil Liberties Issue
Dr. John Breslin*
I. Introduction
The traditional description of the right to privacy is "the right
to be let alone."1  A precise or logical formula of the right is
difficult to find.2 However the following alternative definitions are
instructive when considering the question of privacy in the area of
bank secrecy:
(a) First, freedom from intrusion upon oneself, one's home,
family and relationships. Secondly, privacy of information: the
right to determine for oneself how and to what extent informa-
tion about oneself is communicated to others.
3
(b) The right of the individual to be protected against intrusion
into his personal life or affairs, or those of his family, by direct
physical means or by publication of information.4
These definitions strongly point to the right of privacy which
may be asserted only by an individual. As a result, the implication
is that other types of legal persons, for example, corporations, may
not assert the right to privacy. The definitions also suggest that the
right may only be asserted in the sphere of one's personal life, and
not necessarily one's commercial life. However, it might be wrong
to take such a restrictive view. As at least one U.S. court has
recognized, an individual's financial and personal lives are often
intertwined: "the totality of bank records provides a virtual current
biography."5 In other words, one's commercial life can be seen as
* Barrister, Lecturer in Law, University College, Dublin, Ireland.
1. Olnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
2. JUSTICE REPORT ON PRIVACY AND THE LAW 5 (1970); YOUNGER
COMMITTEE REPORT ON PRIVACY, 1972, CMND 5012, at 17 [hereinafter YOUNGER
COMMITTEE REPORT].
3. YOUNGER COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
4. CALCUTT REPORT (REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND
RELATED MATTERS), 1990, CMD 1102, at 7.
5. Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590, at 596
(Cal. 1974).
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an aspect of one's personal life. Thus, once the possibility of
commercial privacy in the context of civil liberties is recognized
then implicitly, the right belongs not only to individuals but also to
corporations.
II. No General Right to Privacy under English Law
The right to privacy under English Law has been summarized
as follows: "[T]he protection afforded to privacy by English law is
piecemeal, incomplete and inadequate."6 When a plaintiff seeks
to protect her right to privacy she must assemble a hodgepodge of
common law remedies that are fundamentally unsuited for
protecting civil liberties.7
III. Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights
The United Kingdom does not have a written constitution
containing provisions for the protection of basic human rights.
However, this void is filled to an extent by the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR).' An example of the ECHR's
impact on commercial crime adjudication is shown by a recent
ruling of the European Commission on Human Rights involving the
Guinness take-over. In this case, offenses charged against Mr.
Ernest Saunders were ruled to be an abuse of the ECHR.
The Commission ruled that Mr. Saunders' trial was unfair
because evidence given by him, under compulsion, to Department
of Trade Inspectors was then used against him at his trial.9 A
ruling is expected from the court in the summer of 1996.1"
The ECHR also addresses the question of the right to privacy.
Article 8 of the ECHR provides as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence.
6. CIVIL LIBERTIES CASES AND MATERIALS 471 (3d ed. 1991).
7. See, e.g., Kaye v. Robertson, [1991] F.S.R. 62. In that case, an actor who
was recovering in a hospital from serious injuries suffered in a motor accident was
interviewed and photographed by journalists. He claimed damages under the
following headings: libel, malicious falsehood, trespass to the person and passing
off. All failed except for malicious falsehood. Id.
8. 1950 CMD 8969. See also John Mason, European Ruling on Guinness
Questions U.K. Fraud Procedures, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1994, at 1.
9. See Michael & Emmerson, Current Topic: The Right to Silence, 1995 EUR.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 4.
10. Id.
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2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
"Private life" is not defined, but could have a wide meaning
and include one's financial records, whether of a personal or
commercial nature. "Correspondence" would undoubtedly include
one's bank statements. However, the Court of Human Rights has
made it clear that for the right to privacy to be abrogated by a
particular state, the domestic law must do so with certainty and
clarity.12 In particular, the law must clearly describe what degree
of discretion is afforded to an executive agency when its proposed
actions may interefere with an individual's privacy.13 It should be
noted that the ECHR explicitly allows signatory states to abrogate
or suspend the right to privacy in the public interest.
IV. Relationship Between Right to Privacy and the Tournier
Rule
A bank is under a duty to keep secret and confidential
information relating to customers' accounts and customers
themselves." The duty arises from an implied term in the
contract governing the relationship between a bank and its
customer." Indeed, the duty also applies, without doubt, to
building societies, credit unions, and other financial institutions that
provide banking services for their customers. Thus, the duty is
legal, not just moral.
If this duty is breached, a claim for damages will resultingly
arise. 16 However, damages may not provide an adequate remedy
in certain circumstances and in specific circumstances, the customer
11. Id.
12. Malone v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (1984) (case on telephone
tapping and interference with correspondence).
13. Id.
14. Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank, [1924] 1 KB 461 (C.A.).
15. Id.
16. Sunderland v. Barclays Bank Ltd. (1938), reprinted in LEGAL DECISIONS
AFFECTING BANKERS 163 (1986).
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should instead seek an injunction to prevent disclosure of informa-
tion."
In the landmark case of Tournier,18 a bank official revealed
to the plaintiff's employer that the plaintiff was indebted to the
bank, behind in his repayments, and appeared to engage in betting
because the plaintiff had endorsed a check to a bookmaker.19 The
plaintiff was, at the time, under a temporary contract of employ-
ment with his employer.2' This contract was not renewed. The
plaintiff, however, successfully sued the bank for damages.21
The duty of confidentiality may apply to all information in the
bank's possession which concerns the customer, whether or not
such information is derived from the account itself. Although the
Tournier majority implies this right to privacy, several justices did
not agree about the scope of the bank's duty.22 Indeed, Lord
Justice Scrutton held that the duty of confidentiality did not extend
to knowledge from other sources obtained during the currency of
the bank-customer relationship.' Further, Lord Justice Atkin said
that the duty only applied if the occasion upon which the informa-
tion was obtained arose out of the bank-customer relationship.24
However, it would be, prudent for banks to construe the duty
liberally.
The duty of confidentiality arises when the bank-customer
relationship is established. The duty does not cease, however,
when that relationship is terminated, for example, by the closing of
the account. The duty may also arise where the person about
whom the bank has confidential information is not yet, or has never
become, a customer. For example, a duty arises where a customer
has unsuccessfully applied for a loan and the bank is thereby in
possession of confidential information relating to the customer.
25
Occasionally, a bank will pass information to another company
within the same group for cross-marketing purposes. For example,
if a bank has a subsidiary that provides specialist financial services,
17. El Jawhary v. Bank of Credit and Commerce Int'l, [1993] B.C.L.C. 396
(Ch.).





23. Tournier, 1 KB 461.
24. Id.
25. Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1982).
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such as insurance, then the bank might pass customer lists (which
might include confidential information pertaining to those custom-
ers) to the other group company. The U.K. Court of Appeal
considered that disclosure of information by one company within
a group raised an arguable case of breach of contract.2 6 More-
over, given that disclosure is to an entirely different legal person,
such action may well constitute a breach of the duty of confidenti-
ality.
V. Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality
The duty of confidentiality is not absolute; there are excep-
tions. The exceptions are as follows:
1. Where the customer consents to the disclosure of the
information either impliedly or expressly;
2. where there is a duty to the public to disclose;
3. where it is in the interests of the bank to disclose; or
4. disclosure under compulsion of law.
Undoubtedly, the Tournier rule and the civil liberties question
should not be confused. The former is a statement of an implied
contractual term in the bank-customer contract. The latter is a
question that has nothing whatsoever to do with that contract:
rather it concerns the issue of whether the customer has some
higher right. It is accordingly a separate constitutional issue.
VI. United States Cases
27
Several United States cases have reviewed the Tournier
decision.2 Indeed these cases have interpreted the extent of the
duty of confidentiality itself and its exceptions. In Peterson v.
Idaho First National Bank,29 a bank manager informed the
plaintiff's employer who was a customer of the bank, that the
plaintiff employee had drawn checks with insufficient funds to meet
26. Bank of Tokyo v. Karoon, [1987] AC 45n at 53, 54 [1986] 3 All ER 468,
476-7 (C.A.).
27. This section examines principal United States' case law. This area has, of
course, also been regulated by statute at the federal level by the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1993).
28. Thomas C. Russler & Steven H. Epstein, Disclosure of Customer
Information to Third Parties: When Is the Bank Liable?, 111 BANKING L.J. 258
(1994); Donald A. Doheny, Modern Banking: Easy Access v. Privacy, 48 J. Mo.
B. 287 (1992); Mary Catherine Green, The Bank Secrecy Act and the Common
Law: In Search of Financial Privacy, 7 ARIZ. J. INT'L L. 261 (1990).
29. 367 P.2d 284 (Idaho 1961).
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them.3" This eventually led to the employer dismissing the
plaintiff from his employment. In its opinion, the court analyzed
the bank-customer relationship as being one of agent and princi-
pal.31 It held that the duty of confidentiality extends to all bank
customers whether they are equally depositors or borrowers.32
The court also addressed exceptions to the duty and limited the
exceptions to two situations; where the customer consents to the
disclosure being made and where the authorization to disclose is
created by law.
33
In another case, Barnett Bank of West Florida v. Hooper,34
the court adopted all four of the Tournier exceptions. However,
it limited the scope of the obligation of secrecy in favor only of
depositors.36 According to the court, the duty was not owed to
borrowers, nor did it apply to the disclosure of credit information
between banks.3"
The plaintiff company in Graney Development Corp. v.
Taksen,38 defaulted on its loan obligations to its bank, Citibank
N.A.39 The plaintiff sought financing from a second bank which
requested from Citibank N.A. information about plaintiff's credit
record.' An officer of Citibank N.A. replied truthfully that the
plaintiff had failed to pay its loan.41 The court distinguished the
relationship between a bank and its depositors and a bank and its
borrowers.42 The former was an agency relationship, where the
bank as agent was under a confidentiality obligation, the latter was
a debtor-creditor relationship where no such obligation existed.43
The records pertaining to the client were as much the property of
the bank as they were the customer because they were both party
to the debtor-creditor contract. The court said:
30. Id. at 286.
31. Id. at 288-89.
32. Id. at 290.
33. Id.
34. 498 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1986).
35. Id. at 925.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 400 N.Y.S.2d 717 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), affd, 411 N.Y.S.2d 756 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978).
39. Id. at 718.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 720.
43. Graney, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
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One who defaults on his debts owed to a merchant cannot
expect that his default will be kept a secret. While a creditor,
who publishes his debtor's defaults to the public at large may
be liable for breach of privacy, he will not be liable (in the
absence of malice) if he divulges the default not to the public
at large, but privately to selected individuals.'
Courts in other jurisdictions have extended the bank's duty of
confidentiality to cover borrowers and loan applicants. For
example, in Djowharzadeh v. City National Bank & Trust Company
of Norman,45 the plaintiff applied for a loan to purchase proper-
ty.46 The bank official handling the loan application realized from
the figures provided that the property was being purchased at a
particularly advantageous price.47 He mentioned this to the wives
of two other bank officers, who purchased the property instead,
adding $500 to the purchase price to induce the vendor to "for-
get"48 his informal promise to allow the plaintiff time to arrange
financing.49 Although, the court noted that the bank and the
plaintiff had not yet entered into a contractual relationship," it
nonetheless held that the bank had special duties under these
circumstances where bank enjoyed "inordinate power."51  This
relationship specifically prohibits the bank from competing with
customers or even potential customers for investments about which
the bank learns through loan applications.52 The court also held
that the bank was under a duty to keep loan applications confiden-
tial.53
In yet another case, the Maryland Special Appeals Court, in
Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller,54 considered the legality of a bank's
reporting to the FBI a customer's deposit of large amounts of
money.55 The bank's disclosure eventually led to the customer's
arrest for a robbery which he did not commit.56 The court
44. Id. at 720 (citations omitted).
45. 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982).
46. Id. at 617-18.
47. Id. at 618.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Djowharzadeh, 646 P.2d at 619.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 619-20.
54. 408 A.2d 758 (Md. Spec. App. 1979).
55. Id. at 760-61.
56. Id. at 761.
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expressly rejected the Tournier exceptions in this case because they
conferred too much discretion on the bank. 7 The court held that
the bank could only breach its obligation of confidentiality under
compulsion of law.58 The court was clearly influenced by recent
Maryland legislation to that effect. However, the legislation, while
in force at the time of the hearing, was not applicable at the time
of the facts of the case.5' 9 In contrast, the court in Indiana Nation-
al Bank v. Chapman,' held that the bank was not liable when it
disclosed customer information in response to an informal, but
legitimate, law enforcement inquiry because such disclosure was
covered by the "public duty" exception to the Tournier duty of
confidentiality.6
As can be gleaned from the overview of these U.S. cases, there
is a tendency on the part of U.S. courts to confuse the right to
privacy with the Tournier rule relating to a bank's contract with its
customer.62 This temptation should, if possible, be resisted.
VII. Right to Privacy under the Irish Constitution
There is no specific right to privacy under the Irish Constitu-
tion. However, article 40.3 of the Constitution provides as follows:
40. 3. 1. The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far
as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal
rights of the citizen.63
40. 3. 2. The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best
it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done,
vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of
every citizen.'
There has been recent a trend by the Irish judiciary to identify
further ancillary or corollary rights to those set out in article
40.3.2.65 These "latent" constitutional rights include the right to
privacy.
57. Id. at 764.
58. Id.
59. Suburban Trust, 408 A.2d at 764-65.
60. 482 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
61. Id. at 476, 480-82.
62. Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal.
1974); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
63. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.1.
64. Id. art. 40.3.2.
65. J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONsTrruTION 755 (Hogan & Whyte eds., 3d ed.
1994).
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To date, these latent rights have mainly been considered in the
context of state intrusion into aspects of an individual's personal
life.66  However, in Desmond v. Glackin,67 the issue of privacy
was considered in the commercial context. The applicant sought to
restrain an inspector appointed by the Minister for Industry and
Commerce from using information which the inspector had
obtained indirectly through the Central Bank in the course of his
official investigation into the ownership of two companies involved
in a controversial property transaction." The applicant alleged
that the use of the information would breach a duty of confidential-
ity imposed by the Constitution.69 Mr. Justice O'Hanlon consid-
ered the constitutional right of privacy and confidentiality to be co-
extensive with the common law right of confidentiality.' He also
held that the public interest justified providing the information to
the inspector and concluded that no duty of right of privacy was
violated.1
The applicant unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme
Court.72 Mr. Justice McCarthy, speaking for the Supreme Court,
held that there was no principle of law or common sense which
prohibits a Minister of State who has properly obtained information
from transmitting such information to another Minister of State to
assist the latter Minister in carrying out his statutory duties.73
Accordingly, the Irish courts have, to date, taken a sanguine
approach to the alleged constitutional right of privacy where there
is a clear legislative intent to require disclosure.
VIII. Self-Incrimination
The Saunders case, as previously mentioned, brings to mind
questions about self-incrimination under the ECHR.7 4 The
decision of the Court may have far reaching ramifications for all
regulatory agencies in signatory states that depend on an express
or implied statutory abrogation of the right not to incriminate
66. See McGee v. Attorney General, [1974] I.R. 284 (right to marital privacy);
Norris v. Attorney General, [1984] I.R. 36 (failed attempt to declare unconstitu-
tional legislation penalizing homosexual acts).
67. [1993] 3 I.R. 67 (Ir. H. Ct.).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see Marcel v. Commissioner of Police, [1992] 1 All E.R. 72 (C.A.).
71. Desmond, [1993] 3 I.R. 67.
72. Desmond v. Glackin, [1993] 3 I.R. 106 (Ir. S.C.).
73. Id.
74. See supra Part III.
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oneself in the carrying on their functions.7  So far, under Irish
law, the Courts have not yet consistently recognized a "latent"
constitutional right not to incriminate oneself.
76
IX. Fraud and other crimes
In Finers v. Miro, " the U.K. Court of Appeals -held that when
a client acts with a criminal or criminal or fraudulent intent, the
privilege of legal assistance is lost, whether or not the lawyer is
aware of the intent.78 By analogy the implied duty of confidential-
ity in the bank-customer contract would be overridden in the case
of fraud or other crime.79  Nonetheless, it might be possible for
the bank to claim that some of the existing exceptions to the
Tournier rule would allow it to disclose customer account details in
appropriate circumstances, such as disclosure under compulsion of
law or in the interests of the bank. The latter is especially relevant
where the bank could incur substantial liability as a constructive
trustee by being a dishonest accessory to a breach of trust,' by
receiving trust property in an unconscionable manner, or under
legislation enacted in European Union member states, pursuant to
the Money Laundering Directive.'
X. Conclusion
It is vital to keep the civil liberties or constitutional law
question of privacy separate from the implied contractual duty
owed by a bank to keep customer information confidential, subject
to certain exceptions. The civil liberty or constitutional right exists,
75. See, e.g., Bank of England v. Riley, [1992] 1 All E.R. 769 (C.A.).
76. KELLY, supra note 65, at 593. Recently, the Irish government proposed
a change to Irish Tax Law to require solicitors and accountants to inform the
Revenue if a client was in breach of Tax Law. The Law Society, the regulating
body for solicitors, apparently received senior counsel's opinion that the provision
would be unconstitutional as requiring the taxpayer to incriminate himself. The
Government withdrew solicitors from the scope of the section; accountants are, it
is understood, still to be subject to this "whistle-blower's" provision.
77. [1991] 1 All E.R. 182 (C.A.).
78. Id. at 188.
79. In the United States, courts appear to have gone as far as saying that if the
bank has actual knowledge of the fraud of a customer it may be under a duty to
disclose such information to other customers who may have been adversely
affected. Richfield Bank and Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 244 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1976);
Cunningham v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank, 4 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 268
U.S. 691 (1925).
80. Royal Brunei Airlines v. Tan, [1995] 3 All E.R. 97 (P.C.).
81. In re Montagu's Settlement Trusts, [1992] 4 All ER 308 (Ch.).
82. Council Directive 91/308, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77.
THE ISSUE OF PRIVACY
if at all, under United Kingdom and Irish law, in an amorphous and
vulnerable form. The right to privacy under the ECHR is made
expressly subject to a clearly enacted domestic law abrogating or
suspending the right to privacy in the public interest. It is
submitted that neither the implied duty of confidentiality, nor the
constitutional right or civil liberty of privacy, can withstand the
higher public interest inherent in the prevention and detection of
fraud and other crime. Thus, the courts today may be more willing
to uphold the rights of victims of fraud and other crimes over those
claiming secrecy, which is so often "the badge of fraud."' 3
83. Agip (Africa) Ltd. v. Jackson, [1992] 4 All E.R. 385, 406 (Ch.).
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